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ABSTRACT
Business writers and academics have suggested keeping an investing diary to 
avoid hindsight bias. In the diary, investors justify their predictions of future 
events, e.g., “This stock will go up because…” Eliminating hindsight bias 
should improve future returns. However, psychological research on the 
“explanation effect” suggests that justifying one’s predictions in writing induces 
overconfidence and, by consequence, reduces current returns. We test these 
propositions in a set of prediction markets populated by two types of traders: 
forecasters who completed a required investing diary task and non-forecasters 
who did not. The portfolios of forecasters were significantly over-invested in 
securities associated with the forecaster’s prediction. This is consistent with 
prior psychological research and a clear sign of investor over-confidence. We 
further find that forecasters with accurate predictions have higher returns than 
those with inaccurate predictions. However, the returns for forecasters with 
inaccurate predictions were generally no worse than the returns of the non-
forecasters. Our results suggest that while keeping an investing diary may lead 
to biased portfolios, it does not have an overall negative effect on current returns. 
Therefore, contrary to expectations, there is not a trade-off between the long-
term and short-term effects of an investing diary.
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, the retirement plans of many Americans have transitioned 
from a professionally managed defined benefit plan to an individually guided 
defined contribution model (Elkins, 2017). This trend, along with the 
development of online stock trading for individuals (Barber and Odean, 2002), 
means that more people than ever are responsible for their own investment 
decisions (van Raaij, 2014). The involvement of non-professionals in self-
managed investing may be problematic since most consumers have little formal 
training in financial analysis or investing. Moreover, the behavioral finance 
literature suggests that financial decision-making in general is subject to a 
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range of biases and decision traps that can negatively affect returns (Barberis 
and Thaler, 2001). Resulting investing errors can have negative consequences 
for workers before and after retirement.
Reflecting this concern, academics in accounting have begun a stream of 
research on the impact of various biases on the judgments of non-professional 
investors (Eames, Glover, Kennedy, 2006; Hales, 2007; Han and Tan, 2010; 
Thayer, 2011). At the same time, the popular business press has responded with 
a number of books discussing various biases and providing advice on how to 
avoid them (e.g. Belsky and Gilovich, 2000; Montier, 2010; Thaler, 2015).
A very common decision trap is “hindsight bias,” also known as the “knew-
it-all-along” effect. This bias occurs when people overestimate their ability to 
have predicted an outcome after it has already occurred. This bias occurs since 
humans are very good at integrating new information into their existing 
knowledge base (Roese and Vohs, 2012). For example, once we know an 
outcome (e.g., what happened to a given stock), it is very difficult to accurately 
recall our ex ante forecast of the observed outcome since one’s knowledge has 
been effectively updated (Erdfelder and Buchner, 1998; Hawkins and Hastie, 
1990). Therefore, hindsight bias leads investors to be overconfident because 
they think they had accurately predicted past events (Granhag, Stromwall and 
Allwood, 2000; Zweig, 2007). Such overconfidence is predicted to lead investors 
to ignore important new information (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subramanyam, 
1998; Gervais and Odean, 2001), have lower perceptions of risk (Moore and 
Healy, 2008), build less diversified portfolios (Odean, 1998), etc. All of these 
effects may lead to poor investment outcomes (Biasis and Weber, 2009).
While psychologists have proposed numerous approaches to avoid 
hindsight bias, almost all of them fail (e.g., Fischoff 1977; Wood 1978; Pohl and 
Hell 1996). Consequently, many researchers conclude that relying on memory 
itself is the source of hindsight bias (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990). Therefore, to 
help eliminate hindsight bias, both academics (e.g. Baruch Fischoff quoted in 
Zweig, 2007) and popular business authors (Hens and Maier, 2016; Constable, 
2016; Hoffman, 2015; Lim and Cheong, 2017) suggest that investors should 
keep an “investing diary.” In this written record, investors should write down 
their forecasts of the future as well as the reasons they invest in a particular 
stock or other security before they invest. In the future, the investor will not 
have to rely on their faulty memories, eliminating the major source of hindsight 
bias. Thus, keeping an investing diary should improve an investor’s future 
financial decision-making.
However, a long stream of research in psychology suggests that the process 
of recording one’s predictions of the future and accompanying justifications 
may introduce a different bias – confirmation bias – that can negatively affect 
current financial outcomes. Research on the “explanation effect” suggests that 
very act of explaining the reasons for one’s beliefs about a future event increases 
your judgment of the likelihood of that event (Ross, Lepper, Strack and 
Steinmetz, 1977) and negatively affects how you process new, especially 
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contradictory, information, regarding the event (Anderson, Lepper and Ross, 
1980). Both of these effects result in investor over-confidence, which theoretical 
models have shown to hurt financial outcomes (Daniel, et al., 1998; Odean, 
1998; Rabin and Schrag, 1999).
We test this conjecture in a set of real money prediction markets with two 
important features. First, in each market, a subset of traders completes a required 
“investing diary”-like task before the market opens for trading. In this task, these 
traders (hereafter known as “forecasters”) provide a written justification for their 
forecast of a future event (Other traders in the market – “non-forecasters” – are 
not required to submit a forecast or justification). Prior research on the impact of 
the explanation effect on traders was limited to prediction markets where all 
participants were forecasters (Goins, Cipriano and Gruca, 2015). Having a pool 
of forecasters and non-forecasters in the same market allows for testing of the 
impact of the investing diary task on trader returns.
Second, both the forecasters and non-forecasters participate trade in a real-
money prediction market where the values of securities are determined by the 
same outcome that the traders in the forecasters group sought to predict. This 
type of security creates a linkage between a forecaster’s preference for a given 
outcome and their preference for a given security (assuming a positive 
preference for money). This feature of the prediction market securities allows 
us to test the impact of the investing diary task on the portfolio holdings of 
those in the forecasters group.
Our two hypotheses focus on the effects of over-confidence stemming 
from the explanation effect. First, due to overconfidence induced by the 
investing diary task, forecasters will over-invest in securities that are consistent 
with their preferred outcome. Second, if a trader’s initial forecast is inaccurate, 
it is rational to change one’s mind and portfolio to accommodate new 
information. However, traders who have completed the required investing 
diary task may ignore new value-relevant information that is inconsistent with 
their initial predictions (Bodenhausen, 1988; Nickerson, 1998). Both theoretical 
models (Schredelseker, 1984) and experimental studies (Huber, 2007) suggest 
that forecasters with inaccurate predictions will have returns lower than those 
of the non-forecasters.
To test these hypotheses, we used data from the Iowa Electronic Market, a 
small-scale, real money prediction market. Four prediction markets (conducted 
between 1999 and 2002) were designed to forecast a movie’s box office receipts. 
In each market, several securities were offered, the value of which was tied to a 
specific level of box office performance. A subset of the traders were required 
(as part of a class assignment) to complete an investing diary-like task. These 
forecasters generated a written forecast (and justification) of the specific movie’s 
future box office performance that was submitted before any trading 
commenced. The traders in the non-forecasters group were considered 
presumptively unbiased by the explanation effect associated with the investing 
diary task.
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We compared holdings in preferred outcome securities of forecasters 
relative to non-forecasters and found significantly higher holdings in the 
preferred outcome contracts. Thus, we find that the investing diary task resulted 
in unbalanced portfolios, a finding consistent with our first hypothesis and, 
importantly, prior theoretical models of investor over-confidence (Odean, 1998).
Second, in three of the four markets, we found that forecasters with 
accurate predictions had higher returns than forecasters with inaccurate 
predictions. However, in only one market did we find that non-forecasters had 
higher returns than inaccurate forecasters. Thus, we fail to find strong support 
for the findings of prior research on a J-shaped relationship between information 
asymmetry across traders and returns. Therefore, our results suggest that the 
basic elements of an investing diary lead investors to exhibit overconfidence 
which impacts investing actions (as reflected in portfolio holdings) but they 
have limited effect on investing outcomes.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the prior 
literature related to hindsight bias, the explanation effect, overconfidence and 
our hypotheses. Section 3 provides background information on our markets 
and our market timeline. Section 4 focuses on the formulations of the models 
we used to test our two hypotheses. In Section 5, we present our results. Section 
6 concludes with a discussion of our findings and directions for future research.
2  PREVIOUS LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT
2.1 HINDSIGHT BIAS AND INVESTING DIARIES
Hindsight bias is well-studied, having been the subject of some 800 academic 
papers (Roese and Vohs, 2012). Hindsight bias affects judgments in many fields 
including politics (Carey, 2012; Blank, Fischer and Erdfelder, 2003) and 
medicine (Hugh and Tracy, 2002; Arkes, 2013). A study of investment bankers 
found that those with higher levels of hindsight bias earned significantly less 
money (Biasis and Weber, 2009).
Hindsight bias has multiple aspects including distortions of memory, biased 
beliefs about an event’s objective likelihood and an inflated sense of one’s own 
forecasting abilities (Roese and Vohs, 2012). Of its various negative effects, the 
sense of “overconfidence in the certainty of one’s judgments” (Roese and Vohs, 
2012, p. 411) has particular relevance for financial decision-making given the 
stream of research showing the negative impacts of overconfidence on investors 
(Odean, 1998) and markets (Daniel, et al. 1998) alike.
Despite the numerous interventions studied in the psychology literature, it 
is very difficult to eliminate hindsight bias (e.g., Fischoff, 1977; Wood, 1978; 
Pohl and Hell, 1996). This challenge has convinced some researchers that 
the source of hindsight bias lies in, “the process by which information 
is integrated and retrieved in a person’s mind,” (Christensen-Szalanski and 
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Fobian-Willham, 1991, p. 148). Since these processes are not under conscious 
control, they are hard to alter. Therefore, to avoid relying on a person’s 
potentially flawed memory, Davies (1987) supplied subjects with notes they 
used in an initial judgement phase. This written information all but eliminated 
hindsight bias in a subsequent judgment task. The successful de-biasing 
experiment by Davies (1987) provides concrete empirical support of the idea of 
using an investing diary to avoid hindsight bias.
Investing diaries are recommended by both financial writers (Constable, 
2016; Hoffman, 2015; Lim and Cheong, 2017) and academics (Zweig, 2007). 
The essential task for investors is to write down the reasons they invest in a 
particular stock or other security before they invest. In the book, Your Money 
and Your Brain, psychologist Baruch Fischhoff is quoted as suggesting that 
investors keep a diary to document their reasons for investing before they buy 
(Zweig 2007: pages 67–68). An investor should, “(k)eep a record of what was 
on your mind when you made predictions.” Investors should be able to answer 
the question, “I think this investment will go up because…”
By having written records, investors will not have to rely on their 
potentially faulty memories of the past. Since investors will avoid improperly 
recalling their past reasoning, they will be less likely to develop an unjustifiably 
positive opinion of their forecasting prowess. By eliminating hindsight bias as 
a source of future over-confidence, an investing diary should improve future 
financial decision-making. However, the process of making a forecast of the 
future and justifying it in writing – the basic parts of an investing diary entry 
– can introduce confirmation bias due to the explanation effect. As we discuss 
in the next section, the explanation effect can lead to investor over-confidence 
to the detriment of current financial returns.
2.2 THE EXPLANATION EFFECT
Numerous studies in psychology suggest that the act of explanation has a 
consistent impact on an individual’s beliefs about the future, use of new 
information and future behavior. Individuals who provided an explanation for 
a future event judged its likelihood significantly higher than those who did not 
provide an explanation (Ross, et al., 1977) or those whose explanation supported 
a different outcome (Sherman, Zehner, Johnson and Hirt, 1983). In addition, 
individuals who created written explanations are more likely to persist in their 
beliefs despite disconfirming evidence than those who have not developed a 
written explanation (Anderson, et al., 1980). An explanation task can affect 
more than beliefs; in some circumstances, it can alter future behavior 
(e.g. Sherman, 1980; Sherman, Skov, Hervitz and Stock, 1981) as well.
When keeping an investing diary, an investor writes down a forecast of 
the future (“I believe this stock will go up”) and a written justification for that 
forecast. The extant research cited above suggests that writing down and 
justifying a forecast will result in an increased belief, on the part of the 
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investor, in the outcome recorded in the diary. In the case of a prediction 
market, an investing diary entry would increase the trader’s belief in the 
likelihood of the predicted outcome. Given a positive utility for money, a 
trader with an investing diary should prefer the specific security associated 
with the predicted outcome to finish “in the money.” Therefore, we expect that 
prediction market traders who completed an investing diary task are likely to 
over-invest in the security associated with their forecasted outcome. This 
leads to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Traders who have completed an investing diary task 
will hold a higher proportion of the security associated with their preferred 
outcome than other traders.
One cognitive theory supporting the explanation effect is the “availability 
of causal representations” heuristic (Ross and Sicoly, 1982; Hammersley, 
Kadous, and Magro, 1997). Studies of causal representation find that information 
that is more consistent with a subject’s initial explanation receives more weight 
in subsequent assessments of the likelihood that the forecasted event will 
happen. Inconsistent information will either receive less weight or be completely 
ignored (e.g. Ditto, Munro, Apanovitch, Scepansky and Lockhart, 1998; Lord, 
Lepper and Ross, 1979). Therefore, the written explanation induces the kind of 
confirmation bias described by Nickerson (1998) and shown to manifest into 
negative returns for investors by Daniel et al. (1998), Rabin and Schrag (1999) 
and Pouget, Sauvagnat and Villeneuve (2014). Specifically, there will be biased 
assimilation of new, value-relevant information.
We expect that once the prediction market opens, forecasters (those who 
completed an investing diary task) will ignore useful information that is 
inconsistent with their initial predictions and continue to buy and/or hold 
securities that are consistent with their initial predictions. However, the 
ultimate impact of the investing diary task on returns depends on the accuracy 
of the forecaster’s initial prediction. Prior research using prediction markets 
suggests that forecasters with accurate predictions have higher returns despite 
the presence of confirmation bias (Goins, et al. 2015). These results are limited 
since they come from prediction markets in which all traders are subject to 
confirmation bias. In the markets studied here, there is a mixture of forecasters 
who were required to complete the investing diary task and non-forecasters 
who were not.
How these non-forecasters would affect a prediction market is not certain. 
On the one hand, the non-forecasters may be considered uninformed “noise” 
traders who merely provide liquidity to the market (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 
2004). On the other hand, the non-forecasters may be considered unbiased or 
“rational” traders compared to the group of forecasters (Odean 1998). Prior 
prediction market research on price changes associated with value relevant 
information favors this latter view (Goins, et al., 2015).
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To understand the returns of non-forecasters compared to the forecasters, 
we turn to the experimental research on the effect of asymmetric information 
on returns (Huber, 2007; Huber, Kirckler and Sutter, 2008; Huber, Angerer and 
Kirchler, 2011; Kirchler, 2010). Complete information (e.g., a correct forecast), 
of course, should result in the highest returns (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). 
The surprising result from these experiments is that uninformed traders can 
have higher returns than those with intermediate levels of information (Huber, 
2007).
In these lab experiments, the varied information levels were assigned 
randomly. Those traders without any information trade in an almost random 
manner, resulting in returns at the market average (Huber, et al., 2011). Of 
course, those traders with full information leverage this advantage to their 
benefit. The question is: Why do traders with intermediate levels of information 
have returns equal to or lower than traders with no information? One answer 
supplied by Kirchler (2010) is that these traders rely on their incomplete 
information to their detriment in trading with better informed “insiders.”
In our study, we are unaware of the private information brought to the 
market by non-forecasters. However, with respect to the group of forecasters, 
we can identify those who are ex post completely informed (i.e., have accurate 
forecasts) and those who are only partially informed (i.e., have inaccurate 
forecasts). Based on this classification on forecasters and the prior research 
cited above, we expect that forecasters with accurate forecasts will have the 
highest returns followed by the non-forecasters. Due to confirmation bias, 
forecasters with inaccurate predictions will ignore new value-relevant 
information. This will result in the lowest returns of all. This leads to our 
second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Traders who have completed an investing diary task 
and have inaccurate forecasts will generate lower average returns than 
traders who did not complete an investing diary task.
The J-shaped relationship between information levels and returns was 
documented in lab experiments (Huber, 2007). However, variations in 
information across trader were randomly assigned and common knowledge. In 
our prediction markets, traders have different levels of accuracy but whether 
they are well-informed or not is only known ex post. Since we relax two of the 
important limitations of the lab experiments, our study also serves as a test of 
whether the observed J-shaped pattern is robust to these more realistic 
conditions.
3 STUDY SETTING
This study utilizes the Iowa Electronic Market, a small-scale, real-money 
prediction market. It is best known for producing accurate forecasts of election 
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outcomes (Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann and Wright, 1992; Berg, Nelson, 
Rietz, 2008). All trading is conducted via an anonymous, computerized 
double auction that accepts both market and limit orders. All limit orders 
(bids/asks) are queued by price and submission times. The best bid and ask 
prices are available to traders as are past daily average prices and transaction 
levels. An individual’s initial investment in the market is limited to $500 and 
no short selling is allowed. In addition, no transactions fees are charged to 
traders.
Investors may acquire securities from the market in a bundle consisting of 
one of each of the securities in the market. A complete bundle of securities may 
be purchased from or sold to the exchange at any time for $1, the guaranteed 
liquidation value of the bundle. Therefore, the supply of securities in the market 
expands and shrinks as investors desire without affecting the individual prices 
as set by the investors.
3.1 MOVIE BOX OFFICE MARKETS
We focus on a set of 4 markets that were intended to predict the 4-week 
domestic box office performance of a particular movie. As shown in Table 1, 
the movies (and release year in parentheses) were Sleepy Hollow (1999), The 
World is Not Enough (1999), Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone (2001), and 
Die Another Day (2002). Trading in the movie markets began 14 days before 
the opening of the movie in theaters. Investors could access the market 24-hours 
a day through the Internet. Trading continued for four weeks after the opening 
of the movie. The securities were liquidated after official four-week box office 
data became available.
Table 1 - Movie Markets Overview
Movie Sleepy 
Hollow (SH)
The World Is 
Not Enough 
(WINE)







11/5/1999 11/5/1999 11/2/2001 11/8/2002
Date movie opened 
in theaters
11/19/1999 11/19/1999 11/16/2001 11/22/2002
Date market closed 12/16/1999 12/16/1999 12/13/2001 12/16/2002
Number of 
contracts
5 5 6* 5
*As noted in Footnote 1, one of the securities (HPS220H) was split into two securities (HPS240L 
and HPS240H) to promote trading activity. Analysis was adjusted accordingly and trading activity 
in the HPS market was consistent with activity in other markets examined in this study.
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In each market, a bundle of 5 securities was offered.1 Each security is 
associated with a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive range of box 
office receipts within the specified four-week period. For example, in the 1999 
market for the movie, Sleepy Hollow, a security denoted as SH030L paid $1 if 
the 4 week box office performance was $30 million or less. It paid $0 otherwise. 
The SH050L security paid $1 for receipts greater than $30 million but less than 
or equal to $50 million, zero otherwise. All securities are similarly designed.
3.2 TRADERS
Certain traders, as part of a graduate business class assignment, were required 
to submit a forecast of the 4-week box office performance for each movie 
supported by a 2–4 page justification of their forecasts. An example of the task 
assignment may be found in Gruca (2000). In exchange for their forecasts and 
accompanying written justifications, forecasters were provided a $10 trading 
account (They could add more funds up to the $500 initial investment limit). 
They were also asked to execute at least two trades while the market was open 
(buying or selling a bundle of securities is considered a trade).
Participation in these four prediction markets was open to all IEM traders 
with an academic affiliation. The traders that were not required to complete the 
investing diary task are classified as non-forecasters. The number of traders in 
each group as well as trading activity are presented in Table 2.
There were a total of 351, 302, 381 and 180 traders in the Sleepy Hollow 
(1999), The World is Not Enough (1999), Harry Potter (2001) and Die Another 
Day (2002) markets, respectively. While the majority of traders are non-
forecasters, the amount of buy trades and amounts invested in each market are 
quite similar for both groups. On average, the two groups appear to be similarly 
engaged in trading.
3.3 MARKET TIMELINE
All of the investing diary tasks were completed (and submitted) before the 
markets opened for trading. A market timeline is presented in Figure 1.
For these markets, Nielsen/EDI (entdata.com) provided official results of 
box office performance on a weekly basis. Daily estimates were also available 
1 In the Harry Potter and the Sorcerer Stone (HPS) market, one of the 5 securities 
was split prior to movie open in light of sluggish market activity up to that point. This 
created a 6-security market from the split date (November 12, 2001) through the end 
of the market. This decision to promote trading does not appear to have any bearing on 
our hypothesis tests as the data from the HPS market is highly consistent with the data 
gathered in the other markets examined in this paper.




































Market prices night before
movie opens (Portfolio
measurement date)
Figure 1. Movie Box Office Market Time Line
Table 2. Market Activity
Forecasters Non-Forecasters Total
Sleepy Hollow (1999)
Traders 89 262 351
Number of Buy Trades 1,229 984 2,213
Number of securities bought 9,587 8,580 18,167
Transaction Volume in Dollars $1,786.16 $1,830.66 $3,616.82
Funds Invested Per Trader $20.07 $6.99
The World in Not Enough (1999)
Traders 92 210 302
Number of Buy Trades 1,094 1,076 2,170
Number of securities bought 9,744 11,177 20,921
Transaction Volume in Dollars $1,850.31 $2,358.61 $4,208.92
Funds Invested Per Trader $25.69 $8.74
Harry Potter (2001)
Traders 107 274 381
Number of Buy Trades 1,350 1,343 2,693
Number of securities bought 5,547 4,597 10,144
Transaction Volume in Dollars $1,170.08 $1,391.36 $2,561.44
Funds Invested Per Trader $10.91 $5.09
Die Another Day (2002)
Traders 81 99 180
Number of Buy Trades 934 985 1,919
Number of securities bought 4,375 12,158 16,533
Transaction Volume in Dollars $746.92 $2,393.03 $3,139.95
Funds Invested Per Trader $9.22 $24.17
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at other web sites, e.g., www.the-numbers.com. After the final 4-week receipts 
were available, the markets were liquidated. This entails exchanging $1 for 
each winning security held by a trader. Nothing is paid for losing securities.
The Portfolio Measurement Date occurs midnight on the Thursday night 
prior to movie’s opening day. We chose this date since it occurs before the 
introduction of reliable, exogenous information to market. Once a movie opens in 
theaters, information about box office receipts is readily available from various 
content providers such as Nielsen/EDI, the-numbers.com, Variety, etc. Prior 
research (e.g., Krider and Weinberg, 1988; Pennock, Lawrence, Giles and Nielsen, 
2001) has shown that information about the performance of the movie in its first 
weekend creates a highly reliable signal of ultimate 4-week box office performance.
The Return Measurement Date occurs after all liquidation amounts are 
distributed. This captures how well members of each group performed given a 
considerable amount of publicly available information during the four weeks of 
trading after each movie opened in theaters.
4 MODELS OF INVESTOR PORTFOLIOS AND OUTCOMES
To determine the effect of the explanation effect on trader holdings, we have to 
determine their preferred outcomes. Due to the explanation effect, each trader is 
assumed to prefer the security associated with his or her point forecast (Note that 
traders did not know how the securities would be defined before trading began). 
For example, consider a forecaster who predicted that the 1999 movie Sleepy 
Hollow would earn only $25 million in its first four weeks of release. Based only 
on this forecast, we expect that forecaster would buy and hold more of the SH030L 
security since it pays $1 in the event that the movie makes $30 million or less in 
the specified period. Before the movie opens in theaters, we expect such forecasters 
to hold a higher proportion of their preferred security in their portfolios than the 
forecasters who predicted a different outcome as well as the non-forecasters.
All investors started with only cash in their accounts. Therefore, the 
measured portfolios reflect the sales and purchases of securities among all traders 
as well as purchases of bundles from securities from the market. We determined 
the net (or unbalanced) portfolio for each trader by removing all unit bundles 
(one of each of the securities in the market) since they have an expected value of 
$1 and are, therefore, equivalent to cash (Forsythe, Frank, Krishnamurthy and 
Ross, 1998). Using the security prices at midnight on the night before the movie 
opened in theaters, we computed the dollar value of each trader’s net portfolio. 
We then computed the proportion of this value accounted for by each of the 
securities in the market (Forsythe, et al., 1998). To test for the effects of investor 
preferences on portfolio holdings, we compared the distributions of holdings in 
the preferred outcome securities by forecasters whose box office prediction fell 
within the range of a given security and all other traders.
To measure the performance for each investor, we use a metric similar to 
operating margin (MARGIN). The numerator of MARGIN consists of the 
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proceeds of all security sales, bundle sales to the market and proceeds from the 
liquidation of winning contracts. The denominator consists of payments for 
bundles to the market and individual securities purchased from other traders. 
A trader who breaks even has a MARGIN of 1 while one who makes (loses) 
money has a MARGIN of more (less) than 1. By construction, the MARGIN 
for the market as a whole is one. This measure accounts for differences in the 
level of market activity across traders.
In our return calculations, we ignore discounting since the risk-free 
alternative in this market ($1 bundle) bears a zero interest rate (Bonderenko 
and Bossaerts, 2000).
5 RESULTS
5.1 PREFERRED OUTCOMES AND INVESTOR PORTFOLIOS
In order to test for the difference in preferred outcome security holdings across 
groups, we used a Mann-Whitney test since the data on portfolio holdings is 
not normally distributed. The unit of analysis was the individual. Our tests 
compared the group of forecasters whose prediction fell within the range of 
box office receipts for a given security with all other traders. The average 
portfolio holdings of these accurate forecasters were compared to those of all 
other traders in the market. There are 21 such groups across the 4 movie box 
office prediction markets. Each group is associated with one security in the 
four markets.
The results are presented in Table 32.
Our analysis finds that the proportion of the portfolio in the preferred 
security was significantly higher (p < 0.05 level) for 16 of the 21 forecaster 
groups (71%). If we consider marginally significant differences (p < 0.10), the 
number of groups holding a significantly higher proportion of their preferred 
security increases to 17 or 81% of forecaster groups.
These results provide strong support for Hypothesis 1.
5.2 FORECASTING REQUIREMENT AND INVESTOR RETURNS
We separated all traders in each market into one of three groups. Forecasters 
were split into two groups depending on whether their initial forecast in the 
investing diary task fell within the range of the winning security (i.e., security 
2 The sum of the number of forecasters in each group presented in Table 3 does not 
equal the number of forecasters in Table 2 because, in each market, there were 
forecasters who did not hold an unbalanced portfolio. These forecasters bought 1 or 
more bundles and, as such, owned equal amounts of each security on the Portfolio 
Measurement Date.
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Table 3. Preferred Outcome Securities Across Groups
Sleepy Hollow (1999)
Contract Mean (Median) Holdings by 
Forecasters with Prediction 
within Contract Range
Mean (Median) 
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Forecasters with Prediction 
within Contract Range
Mean (Median) 













































Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone (2001)
Contract Mean (Median) Holdings by 
Forecasters with Prediction 
within Contract Range
Mean (Median) 
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Die Another Day (2002)
Contract Mean (Median) Holdings by 
Forecasters with Prediction 
within Contract Range
Mean (Median) 














































that paid $1 at the end of the market) – accurate forecasters – or whether it did 
not – inaccurate forecasters. The third group consisted of all non-forecasters.
Like portfolio holdings, the MARGINS of the traders are not normally 
distributed. Therefore, we used the Kruskal-Wallace test for differences 
across the three groups of traders. The pair-wise comparisons between the 
accurate forecasters, inaccurate forecasters and non-forecasters were 
computed using the Bonferroni correction. The results are presented in 
Table 4.
The overall test of differences across the three groups of traders revealed 
significance in three of the four markets at the p < 0.00 level (The exception 
was the Sleepy Hollow market). In two of these markets, the returns for accurate 
forecasters were higher than those of the other two groups. In these two markets 
(World is not Enough and Harry Potter), the returns of non-forecasters and 
inaccurate forecasters were not significantly different at the p < 0.05 level.
In the Die Another Day market, the returns for non-forecasters were 
significantly lower (p < 0.05 level) than those of the accurate forecasters and 
non-forecasters. There were no significant differences between these latter two 
groups (at the p < 0.05 level).
The results for the Sleepy Hollow market were unexpected since there were 
no significant differences between the returns of any pair of groups. In other 
words, traders with accurate forecasts had no higher returns than those with 
inaccurate forecasts or non-forecasters. This unusual result may be due to the 
previous finding (Table 3: SH90L contract) that the group of accurate 
forecasters, on average, did not hold a higher proportion of their preferred 
security than other traders did. This is unfortunate for them since, while their 
portfolios did not show evidence of overconfidence, the preferred security 
turned out to be the winning contract.
Table 3. (continued)
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The overall test across all traders in the four markets showed that the 
returns for the forecasters with accurate predictions were higher than those of 
the non-forecasters and forecasters with inaccurate traders.
The returns for inaccurate forecasters were lower than those of the non-
forecasters in only one the four markets we studied. Thus, we generate little 
support for Hypothesis 2.
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we try to answer a question that no one seems to be asking but 
should be. How well do the supposed corrections or “cures” for common 
decision biases that have been proposed in the investing literature actually 
perform? Some of these books and articles cite academic literature on the 
source of a given bias. However, what appears to be less common is any 
empirical support for the advice given on how to reduce or eliminate the focal 
bias. Given its pernicious nature, we thought hindsight bias would be a 
particularly relevant place to start.
Clearly, the empirical evidence supporting the use of written materials to 
eliminate hindsight bias is sound (Davies, 1987). However, our focus was on 
the unintended consequences of writing down one’s investing forecasts and 
justifications. We focused on the current effects on investing actions and 
returns rather than the expected future benefits of a reduction in investors’ 
(over) estimates of their wisdom in the past.
Table 4. Comparison of Margins Performance by Trader Group































































A indicates no differences at the p < 0.01 level for a two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test with 
Bonferroni correction.
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Our results show that the act of writing down a prediction does influence 
the traders’ actions in the market. Traders who completed the investing diary 
task held a higher than expected proportion of their portfolio in their preferred 
contract. This is sign of overconfidence predicted by Odean (1998) but to our 
knowledge, unproven in real money markets. The findings with respect to 
portfolio holdings are likewise consistent with the predictions of psychological 
research on the explanation effect. We also note that our results join the few 
instances we know of where an explanation task results in changes in behavior. 
Clearly, the changes wrought by justifying one’s prediction in writing affect 
more than memory or subsequent judgments.
This finding also extends our understanding of the impact of the preferences 
on non-professional investors (Eames, et al., 2006; Hales, 2007; Han and Tan, 
2010; Thayer, 2011) in a more realistic setting. In the extant research in this field, 
a trader’s preference for an outcome is randomly assigned. In this study, trader 
preferences for the different securities resulted from their own efforts to forecast 
an uncertain future event, clearly a much more likely setting. Second, instead of 
focusing solely on changes in an investor’s perceptions or cognitive processing of 
new information, our study shows how trader preferences affect the actual 
buying and selling of real money securities. Adding to the existing stream of 
research, we find that trader preferences have a significant impact on portfolios. 
This occurs despite the information available to all traders embedded in the 
prices of securities in the market. In short, preferences have a significant influence 
on trader actions even in the presence of monetary incentives that should motivate 
traders to use all information available to make the best possible decisions.
Our second finding concerns that impact of differences in returns 
associated with different types of traders. As in the current literature on 
asymmetric information, our study includes traders whose predictions were 
accurate as well as those whose predictions were inaccurate. Prior research in 
a prediction market setting (Goins, et al., 2015) showed that traders with better 
forecasts have higher returns, which is consistent with prior theoretical models 
(Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980).
The critical addition in this study is the presence of a pool of traders who 
were not required to complete the investing diary task. While we do not know 
what information these traders brought to the market, they serve as a benchmark 
against which to measure the relative impact of having an accurate forecast 
versus an inaccurate forecast. This is of interest given the experimental 
research by Huber (2007) showing that traders with no information can have 
higher returns than traders with more, albeit incomplete, information about the 
value of the security being traded. This begets the so-called J-shaped 
relationship between returns and levels of information. In the case of investing 
diaries, such a pattern in our markets would suggest that the investing diary 
task hurt the returns of forecasters with inaccurate predictions to the point of 
being lower than those who did not, so far as we can tell, “do their investing 
homework.”
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Our results do not support the J-shaped relationship found in Huber’s 
(2007) lab experiments. There are several reasons for this difference. First, 
there may also have been differences in wealth between the forecasters and 
non-forecasters. The forecasters generally traded with their provided funds. In 
contrast, a small number of non-forecasters put a relatively large amount of 
money at risk in these markets and accounted for a large volume of the trades.
Second, in the lab experiments, one set of traders was provided with no 
information. The non-forecasters in our markets were self-selected and self-
funded. While some prediction market traders may participate for the 
entertainment value (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004), we surmise that at least 
some of the non-forecasters had enough confidence in their private information 
or, perhaps, trading skills to risk their own money in the market. This lack of a 
truly uninformed control group of traders is one of the trade-offs associated 
with field studies.
As with any empirical study, there are other limitations to this study. These 
are small-scale markets and the traders are not investing for retirement. Our 
forecasters are similar to participants in prior studies (Hales, 2007; Han and 
Tan, 2010; Thayer, 2011) in that they are graduate business students and the 
prediction task is unfamiliar. We also know little about the non-forecasters 
other than they have an academic affiliation.
In conclusion, we show that the actions associated with keeping an 
investing diary lead to over-confidence as reflected in trader’s portfolio choices. 
With respect to returns, forecasters whose predictions were accurate had better 
outcomes than other traders. However, those forecasters with inaccurate 
predictions performed no better and, surprisingly, no worse than non-traders 
who were not required to complete the investing diary task. Overall, these 
results do not argue convincingly in favor of or against keeping an investing 
diary. In the markets we studied, the investing diary was only beneficial to 
those with accurate forecasts. Unfortunately, investors do not know – ex ante - 
which group they are in.
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